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COMMENTS
Other relevant factors are the law applicable to a suit, "the availability of
evidence in the state, ... the relationship between the state or the defendant's
property in the state and (1) the transaction or occurrence which gave rise to
the suit, or (2) the objective of the action."9 2 In other words, it is possible that
the present categories of in personam, in rem and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction are
too arbitrary and self-limiting.93 Traditional notions of jurisdiction couched in
terms of power do not provide proper fairness to all parties involved. It would
perhaps be better to base jurisdiction on a more flexible concept, such as "forum
conveniens" or "competency to adjudicate" which would be more in tune with
modern jurisdictional needs 4 In any case, it has been suggested that with the
advent of long-arm statutes used to assert in personam jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant, quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is an outmoded and unfair proce-
dure.9 5
MICHAEL NELSON
AN APPRAISAL OF SECURITY LEGISLATION IN EDUCATION IN
LIGHT OF KEYISHIAN: A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Give us the child for 8 years, and it will be a Bolshevik forever....
He who has the youth, has the future.
-V. I. Lenin
Absolute security is achieved only in a graveyard.
-Justice Holmes
On January 23, 1967, the Supreme Court announced the decision in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents.' The subject of the decision is loyalty legislation;
the conflicting interests evidence a balancing of academic and constitutional
freedoms against public demand for legitimate state control of "subversive"
activity in a state educational system. Initial reactions to this decision are both
vehement and varied. Protagonists acclaim the decision a landmark for personal
92. Ibid.
93. See generally von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 88.
94. See Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 Yale LJ. 289 (1956); Homburger & Laufer, supra note 73, at 78
(The authors suggest a "functional approach to the problem of jurisdiction, broadly rooted
in reasonableness, fair play and substantial justice."). Cf. Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49
Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub. nom. Columbia
Broadcasting System v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958), 46 Calif. L. Rev. 637 (1958) ; see 28
U.S.C. § 1397 (1964) (federal interpleader statute).
95. See Carrington, supra note 61; contra, Currie, Attachment and Garnishment in
the Federal Courts, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 337 (1961); cf. supra notes 36-37 and accompanying
text. See also Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Texas L. Rev. (1959).
However quasi-in-rem jurisdiction may have continuing viability where it is used to
prevent an absconding resident from selling or taking his property with him, thus avoiding
his creditors. Here it is used as a security device over a resident, rather than as a means to
exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident as in Seider.
1. 385 U.S. 589 (1967) [hereinafter cited Keyishian].
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liberties and academic freedom; antagonists deem the decision to deprive the
states of a legitimate power.
In Keyiskian, the highest court struck down New York's complex of loyalty
laws as being unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in their application to
members of the faculty at the State University of New York at Buffalo.2 Yet it
is suggested that this latest Supreme Court decision restricting loyalty legislationa
neither resolves the controversy as to the necessity and propriety of state loyalty
oaths or disclaimers nor gives clear guidelines to state legislatures for future
loyalty legislation. Indeed, even the dissent in the Keyishian case suggests that
there may be no future at all for state loyalty legislation: "the majority has by
its broadside swept away one of our most precious rights, namely, the right of
self-preservation." 4
THE HISTORY oF LoYALTY LEGISLATION
Although loyalty oaths are not fruits of an American culture, their roots
have been in American soil since European settlers first set foot in America.2
Yet with these roots sprang seeds of discontent with community standards of
allegiance. From the Puritan societies which adopted plans requiring acknowl-
edgment of subjection to their governments, to the formation of the colonies, and
finally into the structures of state governments, mandates of loyalty were con-
sidered by many to be both necessary and desirable. New York State provides an
example of the movements toward control of citizens' loyalty and the discontent
with it.
In New York, in late September 1776, a rebel convention headed by John
Jay set forth a resolution that "a committee be appointed for the express purpose
of inquiring into and detecting all conspiracies which may be formed in this
state against the liberties of America. '"7 Since that early date, New York has
legislated extensively with respect to "loyalty." Although the emphasis has
switched from the historical control of anti-Federalist plots to modern control of
subversive (for the most part, Communist) activity, the basic interests involved
have remained unchanged.8 The continuing state interest in controlling individual
2. Id. at 604, 609-10.
3. See, e.g., recent cases dealing with federal legislation: Apthecker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); and state legislation: Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1967);
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
4. Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 628 (1967). Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart, and White, in
addition to questioning the appellants' standing and exhaustion of remedies (Id. at 621),
vigorously questioned the very legality of the majority opinion: "No court has ever reached
out so far to destroy so much with so little." Id. at 622. The dissent saw the case as being
controlled by Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958), Garner v. Board of Pub. Works,
341 U.S. 716 (1951), and Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (in which sub-
stantially the same statute as involved in Keyishian withstood constitutional attack).
5. See Hyman, To Try Men's Souls ch. I, 1-22 (1960)
6. See Douglas, Freedom of the Mind 71-72 (1962).
7. Hyman, op. cit. supra note 5, at 88.
8. See generally Gellhorn, The States and Subversion (1952); Chafee, Free Speech in
the United States (1954).
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and group action when such activity is determined by the legislature to present
a threat to the very foundation of the state government has been evidenced by
several New York investigating committees and statutes since World War I, such
as the Lusk Committee,9 the Ives Loyalty Oath Law,10 the McNabb Investiga-
tion,'1 the Devany Law,-2 and the Rapp-Coudert Investigations.
13
In 1949, the New York legislature passed the "Feinberg Law"' 4: loyalty
legislation enacted to implement and enforce two earlier statutes. The constitu-
tionality of the statute was challenged and upheld by the Supreme Court in
Adler v. Board of Education.'5 In 1953 an amendment to the law brought within
the scope of the statute the requirement that all state university teachers sign a
"Feinberg Certificate." A constitutional challenge by four professors and one
civil service employee at the State University of New York at Buffalo was up-
held by the Supreme Court in Keyishian on the grounds that the statute was
overbroad and vague. 16
To resolve the problems of the scope of the majority's opinion in Keyishian,
an explanation of the history of the statute is essential. If the New York Legisla-
ture is to draft and adopt a constitutional replacement for the Feinberg Law, the
constitutional infirmities in the former substantive and procedural statutes must
be clarified to avoid future unconstitutional enactments.
THE FEINBERG LAW: A HISTORY
The Feinberg Law'7 was a 1949 amendment to the New York State Educa-
tion Law, providing the means by which the Board of Regents could effect the
pre-existing substantive laws of the State Education Law section 3021' as well
as the Civil Service Law section 12-A.18 Section 3021 of the State Education
Law entitled "Removal of superintendents, teachers and employees for treason-
able or seditious acts or utterances" provides:
A person employed as superintendent of schools, teacher or em-
ployee in the public schools, in any city or school district of the state,
shall be removed from such position for the utterance of any treason-
9. See Gelihorn, op. cit. supra note 8, at 232.
10. Id. at 241.
11. Id. at 242.
12. Id. at 245.
13. "Id. at 247.
14. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3022 (Old § 3022 became § 3023.). The law was introduced by
the then Senate Majority Leader on March 11, 1949. See SJI. 2624, Print 2977, 3101, N.Y..
Legis., 172d Sess., N.Y. Leg. Record and Index (Albany, The Leg. Index Co., March 11,
1949), p. 192. The "Feinberg Law" became the popular name for this law, especially to the
faculty at state universities. A legal memorandum describing the law and its consequences
was distributed to the deans of the State University of New York at Buffalo in December,
1963.
15. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
16. Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 604, 609 (1967).
17. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1949, ch. 360, § 1.
18. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1939, ch. 547, amended by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1940, ch. 564; repealed
by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 790, § 1 (now N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law J 105, as amended, N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 503, § 2).
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able or seditious word or words or the doing of any treasonable or sedi-
tious act or acts while holding such position.19
Section 12-A of the State Civil Service Law provided, in substance, that no
person should hold employment in any state educational institution who, by word
or by writing,
wilfully and deliberately advocates, advises or teaches the doctrine
that the government of the United States or of any state or of any
political subdivision thereof should be overthrown or overturned by
force, violence or any unlawful means .... 20
Declaration of legislative policy was clear. The Feinberg Law-section 3022 of
the State Educational Law-was enacted "to eliminate subversive persons from
the public school system."2 1 The legislature declared that members of subversive
groups, particularly members of the Communist Party and related organizations,
had infiltrated into public employment in the public schools of the state.
22
That body announced that the consequence of this infiltration "is that sub-
versive propaganda can be disseminated among children of tender years by
those who teach them and to whom the children look for guidance, authority,
and leadership." 23 Since, admittedly, it is "difficult to measure the menace of
such infiltration in the schools by conduct in the classroom," in order to protect
the children it was thought essential that the new laws enforcing the proscription
of members of subversive groups be rigorously enforced.
24
In its first subdivision, the Feinberg Law directs the Board of Regents to
enforce the substantive requirements of both section 3021 of the State Education
Law and section 12-A of the Civil Service Law.
25
The second subdivision of the Feinberg Law provides the procedure by
which the Board of Regents should comply with the intent and purpose of the
two substantive laws: that is, the Board of Regents should, after inquiry, make
a list of certain organizations which it finds to be "subversive" on the grounds
set forth in section 12-A of the Civil Service Law.20 Section 3022(2) further
directs that the Board of Regents provide in its rules and regulations that "mem-
bership" in any one of the "subversive" organizations constitutes "prima Jacie
evidence of disqualification for appointment to or retention in any office or posi-
tion in the public schools of the state."27
19. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3021. (Formerly N.Y. Educ. Law of 1910, § 568, added by N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 416, § 3. Section unchanged.).
20. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 12-A (now N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 105, amended by N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 503, § 2).
21. See Declaration of Policy, N.Y. Educ. Law § 3022.
22. See Declaration of Policy, N.Y. Educ. Law § 3022.
23. See Declaration of Policy, N.Y. Educ. Law § 3022.
24. See Declaration of Policy, N.Y. Educ. Law j 3022. Such feeling was common in
post World War II years. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcommittee To Investigate the
Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Coln-
mnittee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
25. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3022(1).
26. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3022(2).
27. N.Y. Educ: Law § 3022 (2) (Emphasis added.).
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In April 1949, pursuant to the Feinberg Law, the Board of Regents estab-
lished a committee to effectuate the provisions of the law. Demands for public
hearings on the merits of the law were at first denied on the theory that a hear-
ing on the law's validity could have no useful purpose. 28 Subsequently hearings
were allowed, however, and after unforeseen delays because of indecision as to
the list of subversive organizations and disagreement as to a means of imple-
menting the law, the rules were issued in July 1949.29
The rules adopted by the Board of Regents provided that the school
authorities of each district should take all necessary action to effect the following
procedures: Prior to the appointment of any employee, the nominating official
should inquire of prior employers and others whether the candidate has been
known to have violated the statutory provisions with respect to membership in a
subversive organization-such a violation should bar employment; each year a
state official must review the employment record of all teachers and if there is
any evidence indicating a violation of any of the statutory provisions, the
school authority should recommend that action be taken to dismiss such teacher;
after such recommendation, school authorities must, within ninety days, either
prefer formal charges or reject the recommendation.3" Not until two months
after these rules were issued was a list of "subversive" organizations finally
agreed upon. The final list of "subversive" organizations, including the Commu-
nist Party of the United States, appeared in September 1949.31
The rules of the Board of Regents, as well as the whole Feinberg Law "com-
plex," were immediately challenged in 1949. Although the complex was determined
to be unconstitutional as a bill of attainder,32 three years later the Supreme
Court upheld the law as being constitutional on its face and capable of con-
stitutional application." The question of whether the Feinberg Law was un-
constitutionally vague was neither argued nor passed upon 4
By virtue of a 1953 amendment to the law, faculty members and employees
of all state-owned and operated colleges or other institutions of higher education
were explicitly included within the scope of the Feinberg Law.3 5 Thereafter
the Board of Regents listed the Communist Party of the State of New York
and the Communist Party of the United States as subversive organizations. In
1956 the Board of Trustees Committee designed the "Feinberg Certificate." Each
28. See Chamberlain, Loyalty and Legislative Action 195 (1951).
29. Id. at 196.
30. See Rules of N.Y. Board of Regents, art. XVIII, § 224 (adopted July 15, 1949).
31. See Chamberlain, op. cit. supra note 28, at 196, 199. Other "subversive" organiza-
tions listed were the Socialist Worker's Party, the Worker's Party, the Industrial Workers
of the World, and the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico.
32. Lederman v. Board of Educ., 196 Misc. 873, 95 N.Y.S.2d 114 (Sup. Ct. 1949),
rev'd, 276 App. Div. 527, 96 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2d Dep't), aff'd sub nom. Thompson v. Wallin,
301 N.Y. 476, 95 N.E.2d 806 (1950), aff'd sub nom. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485
(1952).
33. Adler v. Board of Educ., supra note 32.
34. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 594-595 (1967). But see the dissent in Keyishian in-
dicating that an examination of the briefs in Adler shows that the issue may have been before
the Adler Court although not discussed in the opinion. Id. at 626.
35. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3022(1), as amended N.Y. Sess. Laws 1953, ch. 681.
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person desiring an appointment or the renewal of an appointment in the state
university system had to sign the "Feinberg Certificate" declaring that he bad
read the Regents' Rules and understood that the rules and the statutes consti-
tuted terms of employment; declaring further that he was not a member of
the Communist Party; and that if he had ever been a member he had commu-
nicated that fact to the President of the State University. 36 The signing of this
certificate by faculty members in the State University system was a necessary
condition of employment-refusal to sign the certificate constituted grounds for
dismissal for insubordination.
In 1958 section 12-A of the Civil Service Law became section 105(3), pro-
viding that:
A person in the civil service of the state or of any civil division
thereof shall be removable therefrom for the utterance of any treason-
able or seditious word or words or the doing of any treasonable or sedi-
tious act or acts while holding such position. For the purpose of this
subdivision, a treasonable word or act shall mean "treason" as defined
in the penal law; a seditious word or act shall mean "criminal anarchy"
as defined in the penal law.
37
Finally, a new amendment was added to Civil Service Law section 12-A (c)
providing,
for the purposes of this section, membership in the communist
party of the United States of America or the communist party of the
State of New York shall constitute prima facie evidence of disqualifica-
tion for appointment to or retention in any office or position in the
service of the state or of any city or civil division thereof.38
In 1965, the Feinberg Certificate was rescinded and it was announced that
no person in the state's employ be denied further employment "solely" because
of his failure to sign the certificate. 39 In lieu of the requirement of subscription,
the employee was informed that he must be aware of, and accept as part of his
contract, the conditions of sections 3021 and 3022 of the State Education Law
and section 105 of the Civil Service Law.40 Although a disclaimer of membership
was no longer required, failure to answer any "relevant" question posed by an
official was sufficient grounds to refuse to recommend or make an appointment.
41
Considering employees of the State University of New York alone, these
provisions affected many thousands of persons.42 The Keyishian case, in strik-
36. The certificate was in the form of a negative disclaimer, not an affirmative oath.
37. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 12-A (now N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 105, as amended, N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 503, § 2).
38. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law I 12-A(c) (now N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 105, as amended,
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 503, § 2).
39. See Keyisda,z, 385 U.S. 589, 596. The majority in Keyishian did not consider the
state's rescinding the oath as having an effect upon the standing of the appellants in any
way: "The substance of the statutory and regulatory complex remains and from the outset
appellants' basic claim has been that they are aggrieved by its application." Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. See Brief for Appellant, p. 9, Keyishian.
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ing down the complex of laws, obviated the "loyalty" problems of state faculty
members at least temporarily.43 Although the majority opinion in Keyishian
is not completely clear, certain principles may be derived from it which may
guide the legislature before hastily passing a new loyalty law.
THE Lm lsT OF LOYALTY LEGISLATION
Can there be a balancing between public and legislative demand for teacher
control and academic freedom? What legitimate demands are relevant to this
particular employer-employee relationship? What restrictions may a state place
on a teacher which it may not impose on the general population? Does the very
nature of the teaching position justify more rigorous interpretation of preferred
freedom doctrines than the Supreme Court has been willing to recognize in
criminal prosecutions under the Smith Act? These are a few of the difficult
problems raised in the area of "loyalty" legislation.
This area of constitutional law brings into play the protections of the first,
fifth, and fourteenth amendments. A proposed resolution demands an outlining of
the constitutional contours of substantive statutes which condition employment
upon specific legislative standards and which are commensurate with the pro-
tection of these amendments. What are the legitimate constitutional objects of
and objections to such legislation? The hard case-the Keyishian case-best
illustrates the war of the conflicting philosophies and the battles which each has
won.
First one must examine the interests of the state and the values which it
endeavors to protect. The area of employment with which Keyiskian is con-
cerned-the regulation of the activities of persons devoted to higher education-
is most sensitive to all segments of the society. As evidenced by the history of
New York legislation, the conviction that subversive persons should not be al-
lowed in the classrooms to indoctrinate young men and women with Communist
ideas is of paramount importance. Admittedly, some degree of teacher control is
legitimate; as Mr. Justice Brennan stated, "There can be no doubt of the legiti-
macy of New York's interest in protecting its educational system from subver-
sion."44
It has been argued that the justification for this popular proscriptive belief
is the fact that government should not support those who oppose its fundamental
principles, that only those who support its institutions should be employed by
the state.45 This contention does not relate to the fitness of the teacher for his
position, but rather to his attitude toward the government. This is the belief,
43. Scarcely a month intervened before the New York Legislature proposed a new
statute to replace the old complex. The Marchi-Lombardi Bill, S.I. 2736, A.I. 4317, Print
4471, 6513, N.Y. Legis., 190th Sess., N.Y. Legis. Record and Index (Albany, The Legis.
Index Co,, 1967), pp. S 244, A 409, was passed by the Senate on March 16, 1967. There is
considerable doubt as to the constitutionality of the bill in light of Keyishian.
44. Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 602 (1967).
45. See Brown, Loyalty and Security, 223-37 (1958); Israel, Elfbrandt v. Russell: The
Demise of the Oath?, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 193, 220; see generally Linde, Justice Douglas
w;s Freedom in the Welfare State, 39 Wash. L. Rev. 4 (1964).
787
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
however, that is at the heart of the objection to employing "subversives" in a
state school system.46 Part of the above rationale is based on the fear that these
subversives will, when employed in state educational institutions, through innu-
endo or didacticism, adversely affect the minds of some students and make them
bad citizens.
Based on the philosophy that the state should not employ persons who are
"subversive" to the state, it is argued that such persons are not "fit" to teach
in state institutions of higher learning. Again, this "fitness" does not relate to
the teacher's ability to instruct, to convey ideas and to stimulate thought, but
rather to subject matter of what the state presumes will be taught. Proponents
of loyalty legislation point out that without such control, the doors of public
education are open to subversive persons who would be paid for the opportunity
to use the classroom as a forum to induce a favorable attitude toward their
subversive goals.47 Indeed the Feinberg proscription itself was aimed at those
persons who "teach a proscribed party line or group dogma or doctrine without
regard to truth or free inquiry."4s In short, it is presumed that a person who is
a "subversive" would perform in a subversive manner in the classroom.
Since the Supreme Court has recognized and endorsed "the power of the
state to take proper measures safeguarding the public service from disloyal
conduct," 49 the legal objections to state loyalty legislation are directed against
specific substantive and procedural state enactments for carrying out this legi-
timate purpose. Further objections are derived from the "philosophy" of
academic freedom: 50 "Even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle funda-
mental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." 51
Thus, the opponents of state loyalty restrictions in the area of teacher em-
ployment have attacked various "security" laws on the grounds that they are
unconstitutional on their face; unconstitutional as applied, and void for vague-
ness in the area of the protected freedoms of speech and association; invalid as
unconstitutional restrictions on future action; unconstitutional as bills of at-
tainder; unconstitutional as ex-post facto amendments; and invalid inasmuch
46. The question may be raised whether the meaning of the word "subversive" refers
to those who advocate violent overthrow of the government or to those who are opposed
to the basic principles of the state. It is suggested that the former is the proper interpreta-
tion. The Supreme Court has never ruled upon the right of a state to deny employment to
individuals who reject the basic principles of our constitutional form of government. See
Israel, supra note 45, at 693.
47. See Israel, supra note 45, at 228-29.
48. See Declaration of Policy, N.Y. Educ. Law § 3022.
49. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960). "Disloyal conduct" is not mere
belief. The state's concern must be with action.
50. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 607-608 n.12 (1967) referring to Lazarsfeld & Thie-
lens, The Academic Mind 92-112, 192-217 (1958); Jahoda & Cook, Security Measures and
Freedom of Thought: An Exploratory Study of the Impact of the Loyalty and Security
Programs, 61 Yale L.J. 295 (1952); see generally MacIver, Academic Freedom in Our Time
(1955) ; Konvitz, Expanding Liberties 86-108 (1966) ; Morris, Academic Freedom and Loy-
alty Oaths, 28 Law & Contemp. Probs. 478 (1963).
51. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960).
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as they are pre-empted by existing federal legislation.5 2 Each of these assaults
contains a myriad of variations when applied to specific statutory infirmities.
The Keyishian case illustrates the fact that no matter how legitimate the state's
concern, constitutional enforcement of substantive restrictions can only be at-
tained through a narrowly drawn statute. Indeed the decision casts considerable
doubt upon the ability of a legislature to draw any effective constitutional loyalty
statute controlling employment of university teachers. 53 Even a statute which is
constitutional on its face may be constitutionally defective or seriously ineffective
in its application. These conclusions may be drawn from a study of the case law
in this area, in which Keyishian is the latest, but not the last case in this develop-
ing area of the law.
THE DEVELOPING CASE LAW IN LOYALTY LEGISLATION
The Keyishian case does not stand in solitude. It is only a further clarifica-
tion of the power of a state to take effective measures to control its employees. 4
It falls into the latest class of Supreme Court cases which recognize the possibility
of adverse social and economic results flowing from activity in the Communist
Party and which prohibit these results when state action does not comply with
52. See e.g., Brief for Appellants, pp. 15-19, Keyishian. The primary non-legal attack
against all loyalty legislation as it affects university teachers proceeds: (1) any "subersive"
activity which a teacher carries on outside the classroom has no relation to his activities in
the classroom insofar as his teaching abilities are concerned. An instructor may be an active
Communist and still remain an excellent instructor; and (2) any "subversive" activity which
a teacher carries on within the classroom may be proscribed by pre-existing legislation. Sub-
versive activity in the classroom evidences an instructor's incompetency or absence of pro-
fessional conduct for which he may be removed.
The argument against such a theory is also twofold: (1) the sanction imposed by the
state for activity outside the classroom is less than a criminal sanction and, as such, is a
legitimate exercise of state power to discourage such activity; and (2) if there may be no
legal first amendment challenge to the proscription, the prophylactic effect of the legislation
is derived from a reasonable basis of legislative belief that outside activities of the sub-
versive may be carried subtly into the classroom.
53. As will be pointed out below, the requirements of a constitutional statute, after
Keyishian, may place a nearly impossible burden on the state. Perhaps active and knowing
membership in a subversive organization may give rise to a rebuttable presumption that
the active knowing member has the specific intent to carry out the illegal aims of the organ-
ization. If such a presumption is constitutional, the burden on the state would be less onerous.
54. Cases prior to Keyishian have upheld the power of a state to inquire into its em-
ployees' associations with allegedly subversive organizations as a legitimate means to deter-
mine qualification and fitness for public employment. See Nelson v. County of Los Angeles,
362 U.S. 1 (1960) (dismissal by state of social worker for refusal to answer questions re-
lating to subversive activity); Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958) (dis-
charge by the state of a teacher who refused to answer questions relating to subversive
activity on the grounds of incompetency) ; Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) (discharge
by the state of a subway conductor who refused to answer questions relating to subversive
activities under a statute authorizing discharge when reasonable grounds existed for belief
that employee was of doubtful trust and reliability); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341
U.S. 716, rehearing denied, 342 U.S. 843 (1951) (discharge of a state employee who refused
to take a statutorily required disclaimer oath). But see Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal.,
353 U.S. 252 (1957) (Mere Party membership, even with the knowledge of the unlawful
aims of the organization, may not warrant a finding of moral unfitness justifying disbar-
ment.). See also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). (Some questioning is
characterized as procedural and a legitimate exercise of the government's investigatory
powers. A balancing test is used.); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 379 U.S. 884 (1965). (The Court
gives an extensive review of these and other "loyalty" cases.).
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constitutional requirements: the cases concerning the Smith Act in which the
federal government prosecutes persons for certain kinds of activity in subversive
organizations; 55 Elfbrandt v. Russell,56 in which a state attempted to impose
criminal sanctions upon public employees who did not conform to the condi-
tions of a required oath; and the Keyishian case where restrictions upon public
employment by a state have no impending criminal result but rather possible
economic and social stigma.
57
The cases related to the "membership" clause of the Smith Act, e.g., Scales
v. United States,58 hold that federal prosecution for activity in the Communist
Party, even if the member has knowledge of the illegal aims of the organization,
will not withstand constitutional attack without proof of the "specific intent" of
the particular member to carry out and effect the illegal aims of the organization.
A statute which does not include the "specific intent" requirement, either expli-
citly or through interpretation by the state or the federal courts, is unconstitu-
tionally overbroad. 59 The requirement of "specific intent" recognizes the possi-
bility that an organization could have both legal and illegal aims and that a
member, knowing both these aims, may intend to carry out only the legal aims of
the organization.60 Criminal prosecution of such a person under the Smith Act
would be unconstitutional. Although it is arguable that convictions under the
Smith Act are extremely hard to obtain (because of difficulties in proving mem-
55. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Noto v. United States, 367
U.S. 290 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Apthecker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
56. 384 U.S. 11 (1966). For an excellent analysis of Eljbrandt, see Israel, op. cit. supra
note 45.
57. Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 601 (1967). Loss of tenure can have a disastrous effect
upon the career of a professor: "Whether or not loss of public employment constitutes'punishment', ef. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), there can be no doubt that
the repressive impact of the threat of discharge will be no less direct or substantial." Id.
at 607 n.11.
58. 367 U.S. 203 (1961). Mere sympathizers with a group having as one of its aims
the violent overthrow of the government pose no threat either as citizens or as public
employees. Apthecker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). The Supreme Court has
been explicit in showing what kind of activity is not enough for criminal prosecution. What
must the activity constitute to be constitutionally proscribed? For successful prosecution
under the Smith Act, some overt act which links advocacy to action must be proven. Those
who are urged to overthrow the government by force or violence must be urged to action
and not merely to accept the desirability or propriety of the abstract doctrine. See Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). The action which is urged need not be imminent;
rather, advocacy of action for future overthrow is sufficient. Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951). In essence, the whole problem of "activity" involves the clear and present
danger test.
59. In Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), the membership clause of the
Smith Act was found not to suffer constitutional infirmity because the Court construed the
statute to require proof of "active" membership plus the "specific intent" to carry out the
illegal aims of the organization. Id. at 229-30.
Note that the Keyishian Court did not have the benefit of judicial gloss by the New
York courts concerning the scope of the Feinberg complex. The Court, however, citing Bag-
gett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375-79 (1964) and Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 497, 489-90
(1964), asserted that Keyishian was not a case where abstention, pending state court inter-
pretation, would help. Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 601 n.9 (1967).
60. With respect to a state university faculty member, Justice Brennan explains that
"the stifling effect on the academic mind from curtailing freedom of association in such
manner is manifest... ." Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 607 (1967).
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bership, knowledge, and specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt), the constitu-
tional standards the Supreme Court has laid down for prosecution in these fed-
eral criminal cases are fairly clear.
The second variation in loyalty legislation concerns criminal prosecution
arising from knowing membership in a subversive organization subsequent to
taking a state loyalty oath.0 1 The main issue in Eljbrandt was whether the
standard enunciated in Scales and the other federal cases applies to state legisla-
tive attempts at proscription. Elfbrandt would seem to imply that the Supreme
Court imposes the same standards in state criminal prosecutions for subversive
activity as apply in the Smith Act prosecutions under the membership clause:
Laws such as this which are not restricted in scope to those who
join with the "specific intent" to further illegal action impose, in effect,
a conclusive presumption that the member shares in the unlawful aims
of the organizationYs
The Supreme Court said that such a law rests upon the doctrine of "guilt by
association" if specific intent is not required. 63 The constitutional infirmities in
Elfbrandt were overbroadness plus an unconstitutional impingement upon free-
dom of association. The dissent in Elfbrandt felt that the majority should have
limited its holding to striking down the criminal section of the statute and
remanded the case to the state court for determination of independence of the
criminal prosecution section and the government employment section of the
statute0 4 As so often happens, the dissent foresaw the result in a subsequent case
-Keyishian.
The latest chapter of Supreme Court loyalty cases focuses upon state laws
prohibiting state employment of a person who is a member of a "subversive"
organization, where no criminal penalty is involved, for failure either to accept
a loyalty statute as a term of employment or to violate those terms of employ-
ment once a position with the state has been obtained. The penalty is the
61. The statute involved in Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) provided that a
state employee swear that he "support the constitution of the United States and the con-
stitution and laws of the State of Arizona" and "bear true faith and allegiance to the same
and defend them against all enemies whatever. . ." and "faithfully and impartially discharge
the duties of . . . office." Ariz. Stat. § 38-231 (1965 Supp.). In 1961 the legislature put a
"gloss" on the statute by providing that any State employee who took the oath would be
"subject to all the penalties for perjury" if he "knowing and wilfully" (1) "does commit or
aid in the commission of any act to overthrow by force or violence the government of this
state or any of its subdivisions" or (2) "advocates" the overthrow of the government by
such means or (3) while in the state's employ "becomes or remains a member of the com-
munist party of the United States or its successors or any of its subordinate organizations
having for one of its purposes the overthrow by force or violence of the government" and
where the employee has knowledge of the unlawful purpose of said unlawful organization.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-231(E) (1965 Supp.). To implement the above statute, Arizona required
each state employee to renew his oath of allegiance as interpreted in light of the 1961 amend-
ment. A teacher, declaring that in good faith she could not take the oath, petitioned for
declaratory relief.
62. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. at 19. See also Apthecker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500, 511 (1964).
63. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. at 17.
64. Id. at 23.
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economic, social, or academic disfavor which may attach to the faculty member
upon the denial of his admission to or his removal from the university com-
munity.
In Keyishian, four members of the faculty and one civil service employee
of the State University of New York at Buffalo refused to sign the "Feinberg
Certificate" because they felt that it impinged upon the freedoms guaranteed
them by the first and fifth amendments as applied to the states by the fourteenth
amendment. A three judge district court held against the appellants. 5 The
Supreme Court reversed, 6 holding the requirement of removal from employment
for "treasonable or seditious" utterances or acts under section 3021 of the State
Education Law was "dangerously uncertain" and, as such, too broad to withstand
constitutional attack.67 The same is true of section 105 of the Civil Service Act
since it refers to the definition of "treasonable and seditious" in the Penal Law. 8
Although the Court stated the word "treasonable" as defined in the Penal
Law presented no particular problem, the equation of "seditious" with the words
"criminal anarchy" in the Penal Law makes the possible scope of the word
"seditious" virtually limitless.P9 The Court said that according to the definition,
65. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 255 F. Supp. 981 (W.D.N.Y. 1965), rev'd, 385 U.S.
589 (1967).
66. Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
67. Id. at 598.
68. See N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 105-a (amended by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 503, § 2).
69. Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 599 (1967). The New York Penal Law provides:
Section 160. Criminal anarchy defined
Criminal anarchy is the doctrine that organized government should be over-
thrown by force or violence, or by assassination of the executive head or of any of
the executive officials of government, or by any unlawful means. The advocacy of
such doctrine either by word of mouth or writing is a felony.
Section 161. Advocacy of criminal anarchy
Any person who:
1. By word of mouth or writing advocates, advises or teaches the duty, neces-
sity or propriety of overthrowing or overturning organized government by force
or violence, or by assassination of the executive head or of any of the executive
officials of government, or by any unlawful means; or
2. Prints, publishes, edits, issues or knowingly circulates, sells, distributes or
publicly displays any book, paper, document, or written or printed matter in any
form, containing or advocating, advising or teaching the doctrine that organized
government should be overthrown by force, violence or any unlawful means; or,
3. Openly, wilfully and deliberately justifies by word of mouth or writing the
assassination or unlawful killing or assaulting of any executive or other officer of
the United States or of any state or of any civilized nation having an organized
government because of his official character, or any other crime, with intent to
teach, spread or advocate the propriety of the doctrines of criminal anarchy; or,
4. Organizes or helps to organize or becomes a member of or voluntarily as-
sembles with any society, group or assembly of persons formed to teach or advocate
such doctrine,
Is guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten
years, or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or both.
The Keyishian Court said if the last sentence in Section 160 brings into play Section 161
of the Penal Law, the possible scope of "seditious" acts or utterances has no discernible
limit. Id. at 599.
See also N.Y. Revised Penal Law § 240.15 (eff. Sept. 1, 1967) providing:
A person is guilty of criminal anarchy when (a) he advocates the overthrow
792
COMMENTS
the teacher cannot know the extent, if any, to which a "seditious"
utterance must transcend mere statement about abstract doctrine, the
extent to which it must be intended to and tend to indoctrinate or
incite to action in furtherance of the defined doctrine. The crucial con-
sideration is that no teacher can know just where the line is drawn
between "seditious" and nonseditious utterances and acts.7
0
Furthermore, punishment for mere "advising" the unlawful doctrine, without
guidelines specifying whether such advising or advocacy may be in the abstract,
whether such advising is of the mere existence of the doctrine, whether the person
advising or advocating does himself "advocate" the doctrine, is unconstitu-
tional.71 Indeed, the Supreme Court visualizes such vague language in a statute
as "a highly efficient in terrorem mechanism"7 2 unduly restricting teachers by
jeopardizing their livelihood if they were to engage in these vaguely defined
utterances or acts. The entire majority decision is replete with quotations from
other cases condemning a control of the academic community which suffocates
first amendent rights. The whole regulatory maze in New York was found to be
"wholly lacking in terms susceptible of objective measurement"73 and extra,
ordinarily ambiguous.74
Yet perhaps the most important part of the majority opinion deals with
subsection (2) of the Feinberg Law in which Communist Party membership,
as such, is made prima facie evidence of disqualification. 75 Although the Court
admits7" that the constitutionality of that part of the Feinberg Law was chal-
lenged and sustained in Adler v. Board of Educ.,77 Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority,78 points out that "constitutional doctrine which has emerged
since that decision has rejected its major premise."7 9 The premise which the
majority says has since been rejected is that "public employment, including
academic employment, may be conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional
rights which could not be abridged by direct government action."80 The Adler
Court said that if the terms of state employment were not unreasonable, such
conditions did not infringe upon first amendment freedoms. Teachers were "at
of the existing form of government of this state by violence, or (b) with knowledge
of its contents, he publishes, sells or distributes any document which advocates such
violent overthrow, or (c) with knowledge of its purpose, he becomes a member of
any organization which advocates such violent overthrow.
The constitutionality of the revised statute is as questionable as the Penal Law before the
Court in Keyishian.
70. Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 599 (1967).
71. Id. at 600.
72. Id. at 601.
73. Id. at 604, quoting from Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instr., 368 U.S. 278, 286 (1961).
74. Ibid.
75. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3022(2).
76. Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 593 (1967).
77. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952).
78. Justices Warren, Douglas, Black, and Fortas concurring in the majority; justices
Clark, Harlan, White, and Stewart dissenting.
79. Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967).
80. Ibid.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere."'81 The Keyishian
Court, however, enumerates the decisions since 1952 which have expressly re-
jected the premise that freedoms of speech and association may be denied by plac-
ing a condition upon a benefit or a privilege.82 Proceeding then to the specific
sections of the Feinberg Law, the Supreme Court set out further constitutional
doctrine concerning the barring of employment to persons in listed subversive
organizations which has developed since Adler; specifically: "Mere knowing
membership without a specific intent to further the unlawful aims of an organiza-
tion is not a constitutionally adequate basis for exclusion from such positions as
those held by appellants." 83 Quoting from both the Smith Act cases and Elf-
brandt, the Supreme Court extended the requirement of "specific intent" in
teacher-loyalty legislation to those statutes for which the penalty cannot be
criminal punishment.
8 4
In light of this new enlarged standard, the prima facie disqualification rule
of the Feinberg Law swept "overbroadly into association which may not be pro-
scribed." 85 The infirmity of the prima facie disqualification as it stood in the
Feinberg Law was that such disqualification could not be overcome by showing
either that the teacher was not an active member or that he had no specific intent
to further the unlawful aims of the organization. 88 After Keyishian, a state, pro-
scribing membership in a subversive organization, must show such membership
to be active, knowing, and with the specific intent to carry out the illegal aims of
the organization. Thus the Feinberg Law suffered from impermissible over-
breadth, as it penalized those persons who were actively engaged in the legitimate
activities of subversive organizations, as well as those who were occupied with
the illegitimate activities.
The case, in its application, extends to both the State Education Law and the
Civil Service Law insofar as sanctions are applied to mere knowing membership. r
It is interesting to note that although a great part of the majority opinion relates
to academic freedom and its relation to first amendment freedoms, the rationale
of the opinion may also apply to any person in the service of the state regardless
of his association with an institution of higher learning. The main thrust of the
opinion, however, as well as the specific holding of the case, applies to faculty
members of a state institution of higher learning 88
81. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952).
82. As expressly rejecting the premise, the Court listed the cases of Weiman v. Upde-
graff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) ; Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instr., 368 U.S. 278 (1961);
Baggett v. Bulitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
83. Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 606 (1967). Cases having rejected this principle are said
to be Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Apthecker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500 (1964). The dissent, of course, is able to distinguish the above cases with relative ease.
See Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 620-29 (1967).
84. This is the result which the Eljbrandt dissent presaged. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384
U.S. 11, 19 (1966).
85. Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 608 (1967).
86. Ibid.
87. Id. at 609.
88. Since the entire majority opinion focuses upon the effect that the Feinberg complex
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ACTIVITY IN FURTHERANCE OF SUBvERsIvE, GoAL s: THE REQUfIREMENTS
In order to validly prohibit employment in a state university system, the state
must prove a teacher's "specific intent" to carry on illegal activity. Yet proof of
"specific intent" alone will not suffice to prohibit employment. The intent of the
teacher must be accompanied by some overt activity which may be constitu-
tionally proscribed. The question must be asked, "What activity constitutes the
'clear and present danger' which loyalty legislation seeks to overcome?"
In the years immediately following World War II there may have been a
justifiable fear of subversives infiltrating our state educational system. Such
concern gave rise to enactment of the Feinberg Law.8 9 In the 1950's, sparked
by the McCarthy investigations,"° many states enacted legislation evidencing an
awareness that the control of subversives in the academic community was vital to
American societyY1 The most pressing concern of the legislators was control of
Communist activity-and so a tug of war with fourteenth amendment protec-
tions continued. Yet it was suggested by some, even during the McCarthy era,
that the fear of Communist takeover, although it permeated the American public,
was grossly overrated and reflective of a national anxiety neurosis 2 Few con-
temporary legislative, administrative or judicial findings support the apprehen-
sion of a Communist overthrow. 93 However, the need to instruct the youth of
America concerning subversive philosophies and ideals has been vigorously ad-
vanced by a President of the United States in this decade.94
To what, then, must the "dear and present danger" doctrine relate? Al-
though it is evident that the danger need not be as grave as the forcible over-
had upon chilling academic freedoms, perhaps a state loyalty statute applying to non-
teachers need not be so restrictive. "Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom. . . . That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom." Keyishian, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967). See also the Court's special concern with academic freedom in Bag-
gett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) ; Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instr., 368 U.S. 278 (1961) ;
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 487 (1960); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
89. See Declaration of Policy, N.Y. Educ. Laws § 3022.
90. For an instance of typical McCarthyism see Hearings Before the Subcommittee to
Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws
of the Committee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
91. It is arguable that knowing membership involves an intellectual commitment to
the doctrines espoused by the subversive organization. A legitimate presumption may arise
that the Party member will carry his commitment into the classroom to incite such action
as will further the illegal aims of the organization.
92. See Stouffe, Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (1955). A comparative
study between the relation of the danger of subversive ideas and the danger of obscene
literature might prove most interesting. Both are commonly thought to undermine our
American society not by action but by erosion.
93. See, e.g., Reply for Appellants, p. 6, Keyishian. See generally Sommerville, The
Communist Trials and the American Tradition (1956); O'Brian, op. cit. supra note 91;
Stouffe, op. cit. supra note 92; Am. Bar Ass'n Special Comm. on Educ. in the Contrast Be-
tween Liberty Under Law and Communism, Instruction on Communism and its Contrast
With Liberty Under Law 2-7 (1962).
94. See Am. Bar Ass'n Special Committee, supra note 93, at 4, quoting President John
F. Kennedy, "It is most urgent that the American educational system tackle in earnest
the task of teaching American youth to confront the reality of totalitarianism in its toughest,
most militant form-which is Communism-with the facts and values of our American
heritage."
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turn of the government,9 5 to restrict first amendment freedoms of speech and
association the regulation must relate to one of the objectives of the control of
subversive activties. It cannot be that the clear and present danger relates to
incompetent or insubordinate teachers; there is presently adequate protection
through non-loyalty legislation. If the clear and present danger arises from the
teacher's own subversive activities or from the effect of his activities upon his
students, the legislation proposed in the appendix allows state action only when
the teacher's overt acts are conspicuously in furtherance of illegal goals.07 It is
submitted that the clear and present danger exists when the activity of a teacher
falls within one of the subdivisions of the proposed statute.
FURTHER PROCEDURAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS:
A NECESSITY OR AN INFIRMITY?
Assuming the appended legislation is both constitutional on its face and as
applied, the important issue arises whether, to be effective, the substantive law
must be procedurally reinforced by regulations similar to those which existed
under the old Feinberg "complex," specifically, State Education Law section
3022(2). Should a new loyalty "oath" or "disclaimer" of subversive activity
buttress the proposed substantive law? For those who would suggest that some
procedure is either desirable or necessary, several constitutional, historical, and
conceptual objections should be noted.
If the proposed legislation is without constitutional infirmity, the same
limitations propounded by Keyishian with regard to substantive legislation would
also apply to any procedure by which a state legislature, a state university, or a
Board of Regents, would endeavor to make the proposed proscription more
effective. Even in the light of cases recognizing the power of a state to require
an employee to reveal past or present membership or association with organiza-
tions which advocate the violent overthrow of the government, 5 case law clearly
95. See, e.g., Woods v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) (contempt); Garner v. Louisiana,
368 U.S. 157 (1961) (public order).
96. For an extensive treatment of New York dismissal procedures, see Comment, New
York Administrative Procedure For the Dismissal of Teaching Personnel, 16 Buffalo L. Rev.
815 (1967).
97. It should be noted, however, that there may be some doubt as to the "danger"
of individual illegal activity as opposed to activity which is linked to an organization with
illegal aims. It is generally assumed that the existence of a conspiracy constitutes the danger.
See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The magnitude of the danger
discounted by its probability is one way of determining a "clear and present danger" in
federal criminal prosecutions. Id. at 510. Perhaps that danger is not as great where activity
is neither directed nor effectuated on a world-wide scale.
98. Cases prior to Keyishian, however, outlined the constitutional limits of the state's
power to inquire into the allegedly subversive association of its employees: Cramp v. Florida,
368 U.S. 278 (1961). (A disclaimer may not be so vague as to inhibit free association of
an innocent kind.) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (Broad inquiries into activities
of a non-subversive character may not be made.) ; Nostrand v. Little, 362 U.S. 474 (1960)
(The state must afford an employee procedural due-process, i.e., specification of charges
and an opportunity to be heard when an employee is discharged.); Weiman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183 (1952) (A state may not require a disclaimer of innocent as well as knowing
membership in a subversive organization.).
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distinguishes the power of the state to deny employment solely because of this
membership or association 9 The state inquiry must clearly relate to some valid
standard of disqualification-mere knowing membership is not such a standard.100
The question follows, then, may a state require a teacher to answer questions
relating to his "active" membership? His "knowing" membership? His "specific
intent" to carry out the illegal aims of the organization? Even assuming that
these questions are relevant to some valid standard of disqualification or employ-
ment, must not the protection of the fifth amendment "self-incrimination?'
clause come into play?' 01
Obviously, if the state may require an answer to the above inquiries, the
teacher is confronted with two equally unpleasant alternatives: he may refuse
to answer the questions and thereby be subject to disqualification; or he may
answer the inquiries and subject himself to possible criminal sanctions.
102 It
is a choice between the "rocks and the whirlpool." 0 3 Two cases decided by
the Supreme Court only a week before Keyishian illuminate this disastrous
dichotomy.
In Garrity v. New Jersey,'14 a majority of the Court reversed a conviction
of several New Jersey police officers who were confronted by officials of the state
concerning the alleged fixing of traffic tickets. Although they were advised of
their right to remain silent, the police officers were told that if they exercised this
"right" they were subject to removal from office. Having answered certain
questions, some of their answers were subsequently used against them in a con-
spiracy prosecution. Speaking for the Court, Justice Douglas said the choice
imposed upon the officers between self-incrimination and job forfeiture con-
stituted such coercion as to amount to a coerced confession prohibited by the
fifth amendment and applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment.'
0 5
The same day the Garrity opinion was announced, Justice Douglas, speaking
again for a majority of the Court in Spevak v. Klein, 06 condemned the action of
99. See, e.g., Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1, 8 (1960); Beilan v. Board of
Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 405 (1958); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 474, 477 (1958); Israel,
Rljbrandt v. Russell: The Demise of the Oath, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 193.
100. Israel, supra note 99, at 208; Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 474, 477 (1958).
101. There is, of course, a theory of multiple justifications which the Supreme Court has
recognized. These cases involve a balancing of the justifications for government inquiry
with the refusal to comply with the same. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109 (1959).
102. A teacher may fall within the purview of either the New York Criminal Anarchy
Statute (quoted supra note 69) or within the "membership clause" of the Smith Act. But the
cases of Beilan v. Board of Educ. 357 U.S. 399 (1958), Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958),
and Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960) upheld state refusal of employment
where the Court characterized the appellants' privilege against self-incrimination as a general
lack of uncooperativeness.
103. Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234 (1966), quoting from Froal Trucking Co. v. Rail-
road Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
104. 385 U.S. 493 (1967). Majority opinion written by Justice Douglas, joined by
Justices Warren, Black, Brennan, and Fortas.
105. "We conclude that policemen, like teachers and lawyers, are not relegated to a
watered-down version of constitutional rights." Id. at 500.
106. 385 U.S. 511 (1967). Justices Douglas, Warren, Black, and Brennan for the
majority. Justice Fortas concurred separately.
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New York State disbarring a lawyer because of his refusal to produce judicial
records and honor a subpoena duces tecum. The attorney's sole defense was that
either producing the records or giving testimony would tend to incriminate
him.10 7 In overruling the recent case of Cohen v. Hurley,08 and relying heavily
upon fifth amendment protections set forth in Malloy v. Hogan,1 9 the Court
stated, "the threat of disbarment and the loss of professional standing, profes-
sional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of compulsion to make a
lawyer relinquish the privilege.""10 Surely this "powerful instrument of compul-
sion" is as evident in the questioning of a teacher as it is in the questioning of a
police officer or a lawyer. All are professionals. All are faced with the same in-
sidious "choice." All must have the protection of the fifth amendment. An
affimative answer to state inquiries in all three examples could provide "a link
in the chain needed in prosecution.""' It is suggested that any person employed
by a state, including one in the educational system, should never be placed in
the position of having to choose between his job and his constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
It is probable that neither oaths of affirmation of allegiance to government
nor disclaimers of subversive activities serve a useful purpose in a state uni-
versity system when used as a condition of employment. Indeed, an oath or dis-
claimer may be totally ineffective in serving the state's purpose. 1 2 For the most
part, those persons who challenge the oaths and disclaimers are conscientious ob-
jectors to an impingement upon what they feel, and the Supreme Court now
recognizes, are constitutionally protected rights. The hard core subversive, the
person trained and educated in methods of deceit, would have no qualms of
falsifying an oath or disclaimer. His objectives are attained through indoc-
trination in the classroom and not through non-compliance with a condition of
employment. Now, however, through what is hoped to be constitutionally effec-
tive legislation, the subversive teacher can be prevented from carrying out his
callous indoctrination of students. Yet under the same statute, no teacher who
wishes to give an honest expression of a political viewpoint will be faced with
the uncertainties with which he was confronted under the Feinberg Law. It is
hoped that proposed legislation does not offer a potential threat to freedom of
speech, association, or belief. It is an attempt to outline a middle ground-a
constitutional ground-in the battle of the war of philosophies until the time
when further Supreme Court decisions evolve." 3
107. Id. at 512-13.
108. 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
109. 378 U.S. 1 (1965).
110. Spevak v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967).
111. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950).
112. See Israel, supra note 99, at 247.
113. The proposed legislation in the appendix is similar in parts to the Adams-Schmidt
Bill, proposed New York legislation subsequent to Keyishian, which was a result of the
program of the New York Attorney General. See S.I. 4098, A.I. 5353, Print 5639, 6862, N.Y,
Legis., 190th Sess., N.Y. Legis. Record and Index (Albany, The Legis. Index Co., 1967),
pp. S 366, A 511.
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED LEGISLATION To REPLACE
THE FEINBERG LAW COMPLEX:
THE SuBSTANTIvE LAW
I. Disqualification of State Employees
No person shall be appointed to any office or position in the serv-
ice of the state or of any political or civil division thereof, nor shall any
person employed in such appointed office or position be continued in
such employment, nor shall any person be employed in the public serv-
ice as superintendent, principal, president, dean, teacher, or other em-
ployee in any public school or academy or any college or university or
any other institution of higher education owned and operated by the
state or any subdivision thereof who:
(a) is an active participating member of an organization, group,
society, or assembly which has for one of its purposes the overthrow
or destruction, by force or violence, of the government of the United
States, or the government of any state, territory, district, or possession
thereof or the government of any political subdivision therein and who
has knowledge of the illegal purposes; and who has the specific intent
to carry out the illegal aims of the organization, group, society, or
assembly; or
(b) with the specific intent to cause the overthrow or destruction,
by force or violence, of the government of the United States or the gov-
ernment of any State, territory, district, or possession thereof, or the
government of any political subdivision therein, and with the further
intent to incite others to such action as may bring about the forcible
overthrow of such government, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates,
sells, distributes, or publicly displays any writing or printed matter
which teaches, advises or advocates the active and illegal overthrow
of the government; or
(c) with the specific intent to cause the overthrow or destruction,
by force or violence, of the government of the United States or the
government of any state, territory, district, or possession thereof, or
the government of any political subdivision therein, and with the further
intent to incite others to such action as may bring about the forcible
overthrow of such government, teaches, advises or advocates the active
and illegal overthrow of the government.
II. Provisions for Review
Any person who is dismissed from or declared ineligible for em-
ployment pursuant to this section shall within three months from such
dismissal or rejection be entitled to an order to show cause, signed by a
Justice of the New York State Supreme Court, why a hearing on such
charges of ineligibility should not be had. Until the final judgment on
such hearing, the order to show cause shall stay the effect of any order
of dismissal or ineligibility based on the provisions of this section; pro-
vided, however, that during such stay a person so dismissed shall be
suspended without pay, and, if the final determination shall be in his
favor, he shall be restored to his position with pay for the period of
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such suspension, less the amount of compensation which he may have
earned in any other employment or occupation and any unemployment
insurance benefits he may have received during such period. The hear-
ing shall consist of the taking of testimony in open court with the op-
portunity for cross-examination. The burden of sustaining the order
of dismissal or ineligibility by a fair preponderance of the credible




(a) The purpose of this section is to eliminate from the state educational
system all persons whose membership in an organization which aims to overthrow
the government by force or violence is such that the member knows of these
illegal aims and intends to carry them out. Yet, even proof of the above cannot
merit disqualification unless some action by the teacher is shown to be in further-
ance of these aims. Without this requirement a state may be punishing a teacher's
former activity or only his beliefs or thoughts.
Active membership must be proven to consist of overt acts which link a
teacher to the illegal activity of the organization. Such activity is separate and
distinct from any knowledge the teacher may have of the organization's illegal
aims. Relevant to determining whether the teacher's activities are sufficient for
discharge under this statute are (1) his official capacity in the organization, (2)
the frequency with which he attends the meetings of the organization, (3) his
donations to the organization, (4) his subscriptions for the organization, and
(5) his open advocacy of the illegal aims of the organization.
Proof of active, knowing membership in such organization which has for
one of its aims the overthrow, by force or violence, of one of the governments
listed herein, plus proof of the employee's specific intent to bring about these
illegal aims, shall constitute prima facie evidence of disqualification.
(b) The purpose of this section is to prohibit employment by the state to
those persons who may not be members of an organization which espouses the
forcible overthrow of the governments listed herein but whose written activities
are intended to bring about the same result. This section and section (c) recog-
nize the fact that a person need not be a member of an organization to carry on
such activity as is specifically calculated to effect the forcible overthrow of the
government.
It is the legislative judgment that the activity described in sections (b)
and (c) of this law may be so pervasive that, if not proscribed, such activity
shall constitute a clear and present danger to the peaceful and orderly existence
of the governments described herein.
(c) The purpose of this section is to prohibit employment by the state to
those persons who may not be members of an organization which espouses the




The fact of disqualification under this statute shall entitle a teacher to an
order to show cause as a matter of right.
DAVID R. PFALzGRAF
RECENT TRENDS IN STATE PLANNING LEGISLATION:
A SELECTIVE SURVEY
Air pollution, population shifts, floods, research duplication, sewerage, inade-
quate recreational facilities, transportation patterns, economic stability, . .. on
and on runs the growing list of critical problems, both big and small, facing every
level of modern government. Each individual problem falls to some person, some
group, or some agency, whose duty it is to provide a satisfactory policy for
future control. Unfortunately there exists a tremendous degree of overlap among
these various problems, and the individual solution-seekers are often frustrated
by conflicting policies, needless duplication, and ever-present fiscal limitations.
The community's answer has been what may be loosely termed "planning," a
word of many meanings,1 but which may be broadly described in this context
as an attempt to recognize and overcome such problems in a manner designed
to promote the optimum physical, economic and social growth of the com-
munity. Planning in the United States generally began in the cities and slowly
spread to the village, town, and county levels; 2 more recently, aided by the sub-
stantial thrust of various federal aid programs, planning on a regional basis
is becoming an organized reality3 Current trends indicate that we are in the
process of making the next obvious, logical, and perhaps necessary step, which
is the creation of effective plannning organizations at the state level.
AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
The history of formalized state planning dates back more than three
decades.4 Some forty-six states enacted state planning legislation in the post-
depression era of the mid-1930's, mainly due to the encouragement of the Na-
tional Resources Planning Board.5 The immediate objective of many of these
1. See generally, Seeley, What is Planning? Definition and Strategy, 28 J. of the Ameri-
can Institute of Planners [hereinafter cited I. Am. Inst. of Planners] 91 (1962).
2. The history of municibal planning over a slan of some four centuries is developed
in Reps, Making of Urban America: A History of City Planning in the United States (1965).
For an analysis of the present organizational posture of local planning, see Law and Land:
Anglo-American Planning Practice (Haar ed. 1964); International City Manager's Ass'n,
Local Planning Administration (3rd ed. 1959).
3. See generally, Wise, Current Develonpments in Regional Planning in the United States,
in American Society of Planning Officials, Planning 1965, at 47 (1965). For a special issue
devoted to regional planning, see 30 1. Am. Inst. of Planners (Friedmann ed. May 1964).
4. See generally, Black, State Planning as an Established Procedure, 2 J. Am. Inst. of
Planners 85 (1936).
5. Committee on State Planning, State Planning: Its Function and Organization, 25
J. Am. Inst. of Planners 207, 210 (1959).
